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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS









On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 99-cr-00077-1 and 99-cr-00503-1)
District Judges: Honorable Herbert J. Hutton, Honorable Jay C. Waldman 
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 4, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and BECKER, Circuit Judges





Christopher Dodd appeals from a judgment in a criminal case following his
bargained-for pleas of guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18
2U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Defendant’s sole challenge is to the imposition of a two point
upward adjustment for reckless endangerment during flight pursuant to § 3C1.2 of the
Sentencing Guidelines.  We will affirm.
First, in his guilty plea agreement, Dodd stipulated to the enhancement, i.e., that he
had recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person
on two occasions, while fleeing from police officers.  We have held that a defendant who
has entered into a guilty plea agreement may not object to his stipulations on appeal. 
United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 1998).  The fact that the District Court
resolved this aspect of the matter by reference to the oft-quoted Canadian culinary
rule—“what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander”—was obviously a shorthand
manner of expression and does not undermine the District Court’s determination.
Second, even if Dodd had not so stipulated, the record fully supports the
enhancement.  His attempt, on November 15, 1998, to retrieve a gun from his waistband
while wrestling with the officers was conduct which could have resulted in the death of
one or both officers, or an innocent bystander.  Additionally, Dodd’s conduct on April 29,
1999, when, while running from the officers, he threw a 9 millimeter Intratec
semiautomatic pistol on the pavement loaded with seven rounds of ammunition, creating
the risk that the gun could have accidentally fired thereby severely wounding or killing
the officers or an innocent bystander, was also reckless and dangerous.  Under these
circumstances, the District Court clearly did not err in applying the two-level
3enhancement for reckless endangerment in computing Dodd’s sentencing guidelines
range.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
